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Appendix Z
The Nature and Cause: Case Law
Page Z - 1 of 14
The Federal Zone:
Reader's Notes:
Page Z - 2 of 14
Appendix Z
[following quotes from Modern Constitutional Law, by Antineau]:
5:116. Historical Considerations
The United States Supreme Court has often recognized the
relevance of the lessons of history in determining the particular
demands of due process of law. Due process of law, says the
Court, is "a historical product."
Justice Frankfurter has aptly pointed out that the Sixth and
Seventh Amendment guarantees of criminal and civil jury trials
are almost entirely defined by historical materials. "The gloss
may be the deposit of history," he observes, "whereby a term
gains technical content. Thus the requirements of the Sixth and
Seventh Amendments for trial by jury in the federal courts have a
rigid meaning."
[Modern Constitutional Law, by Chester J. Antineau]
[The Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Company]
[Rochester, New York, 1969, emphasis added]
Footnotes cite the following cases:
Rochin vs California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952)
Jackman vs Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22 (1922)
5:118. The moral basis of the norm
Due process of law is defined in procedural cases by the
Supreme Court with full consideration to what society considers
wrong and unfair.
Justice Frankfurter, who contributed greatly to the
definition and expansion of procedural due process, stated in
1950: "the Due Process Clause embodies a system of rights based
on moral principles so deeply embedded in the traditions and
feelings of our people as to be deemed fundamental to a civilized
society as conceived by our whole history." On many another
occasion, the Court has stressed the role of "conscience" in
defining due process of law.
[Modern Constitutional Law, by Chester J. Antineau]
[The Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Company]
[Rochester, New York, 1969, emphasis added]
Footnotes cite the following cases:
Solesbee vs Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9 (1950)
Leland vs Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952)
Snyder vs Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934)
Page Z - 3 of 14
The Federal Zone:
[following quotes are from Rochin vs People of California]:
Words being symbols do not speak without a gloss. On the
one hand the gloss may be the deposit of history, whereby a term
gains technical content. Thus the requirements of the Sixth and
Seventh Amendments for trial by jury in the federal courts have a
rigid meaning. No changes or chances can alter the content of
the verbal symbol of "jury" -- a body of twelve men who must
reach a unanimous conclusion if the verdict is to go against the
defendant.3 On the other hand, the gloss of some of the verbal
symbols of the Constitution does not give them a fixed technical
content. It exacts a continuing process of application.
____________________
3. This is the federal jury requirement constitutionally
although England and at least half of the States have in
some civil cases juries which are composed of less than 12
or whose verdict may be less than unanimous. ...
[Rochin vs People of California, 342 U.S. 165, 169]
[emphasis added]
[Comment: Accordingly, does not the "nature and cause of the
accusation" also have a rigid meaning, founded on the lessons of
history, so deeply embedded in the traditions and feelings of our
people as to be deemed fundamental to a civilized society?]
[following quotes from Modern Constitutional Law, by Antineau]:
5:5. Notice of the Accusation
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
requires that every person accused shall "be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation," and the same rule is binding
upon persons brought to trial in the state courts under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Additionally, state constitutional clauses
customarily provide that "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him."
A person charged with a crime has the constitutional right
to receive from the government a written statement indicating
with particularity the offense to which he must plead and prepare
a defense. The necessity of such a statement has been recognized
by the Oklahoma appellate court which observes:
"Every person accused of an offense, under the Constitution
and statutes of this State, has a right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him. ... It
is difficult to see how this can be safely and orderly
accomplished without a definite written accusation or
complaint."
[Cole vs Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948)]
Page Z - 4 of 14
Appendix Z
Charging a person in the language of an unconstitutionally
vague statute or ordinance is violative of his constitutional
rights.
An information, indictment, complaint or summons used to
commence a criminal prosecution must contain sufficient facts and
specific details to reasonably apprise the defendant of the exact
charge placed against him. The time, place and manner of the
alleged offense must customarily be set out.
The Supreme Court has ruled that it violates due process for
a state high court to affirm convictions under a criminal statute
for the violation of which the defendants had not been charged.
The Court stated:
No principle of procedural due process is more clearly
established than that notice of the specific charge, and a
chance to be heard in a trial of the issues raised by that
charge, if desired, are among the constitutional rights of
every accused in a criminal proceeding in all courts, state
or federal. ... It is as much a violation of due process to
send an accused to prison following conviction of a charge
on which he was never tried as it would be to convict him
upon a charge that was never made.
[Cole vs Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948)]
[Modern Constitutional Law, by Chester J. Antineau]
[The Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Company]
[Rochester, New York, 1969]
[emphasis added]
Footnotes cite the following cases:
Cole vs Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948)
Ex parte Bochman, 201 P 537, 541 (1921)
Shreveport vs Brewer, 72 So 2d 308 (1954)
Telheard vs Bay St. Louis, 40 So 326 (1905)
Scott vs Denver, 241 P2d 857 (1952)
Bellville vs Kiernan, 121 A2d 411 (1956)
[Comment: A core issue raised by the charge of violating 7203 is
the definition of "any person required." To assume that
DEFENDANT was in the class of persons required, is to make a
conclusion of law, not to state a fact. What section of the IRC
defines which persons are required? Are Canadian persons
required? Are Australian Aborigines required? The presiding
judge merely instructed the jury that "THE LAW REQUIRES EVERY
CITIZEN OF THIS COUNTRY TO FILE AN INCOME TAX RETURN." That is
not what the statute says; that is not what the regulations say.
The presiding judge misquoted the law in his instructions to the
trial jury.]
Page Z - 5 of 14
The Federal Zone:
[following quotes from Cole vs Arkansas]:
2. Constitutional law
Notice of specific charge and a chance to be heard in a
trial of the issues raised by that charge, if desired, are among
the constitutional rights of every accused in a criminal
proceeding. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 14
3. Constitutional law
It is as much a violation of due process to send an accused
to prison following conviction of a charge on which he was never
tried as it would be to convict him upon a charge that was never
made. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 14
[2, 3] No principle of procedural due process is more
clearly established than that notice of the specific charge, and
a chance to be heard in a trial of the issues raised by that
charge, if desired, are among the constitutional rights of every
accused in a criminal proceeding in all courts, state or federal.
In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 68 S.Ct. 499, and cases there cited.
If, as the State Supreme Court held, petitioners were charged
with a violation of Section 1, it is doubtful both that the
information fairly informed them of that charge and that they
sought to defend themselves against such a charge; it is certain
that they were not tried for or found guilty of it. It is as
much a violation of due process to send an accused to prison
following conviction of a charge on which he was never tried as
it would be to convict him upon a charge that was never made. De
Jonge vs State of Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 362, 57 S.Ct. 255, 259,
81 L.Ed. 278.
We are constrained to hold that the petitioners have been
denied safeguards guaranteed by due process of law -- safeguards
essential to liberty in a government dedicated to justice under
law.
[Cole vs Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 201 (1948)]
[emphasis added]
[following quotes from In re Oliver]:
11. Constitutional law
A person's right to reasonable notice of a charge against
him and an opportunity to be heard in his defense are basic, and
such rights include, as a minimum, a right to examine witnesses
against him, to offer testimony, and to be represented by
counsel.
Page Z - 6 of 14
Appendix Z
16. Constitutional law
No man's life, liberty or property may be forfeited as
punishment until there has been a charge fairly made and fairly
tried in a public tribunal. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 14
[10, 11] We further hold that failure to afford the
petitioner a reasonable opportunity to defend himself against the
charge of false and evasive swearing was a denial of due process
of law. A person's right to reasonable notice of a charge
against him, and an opportunity to be heard in his defense -- a
right to his day in court -- are basic in our system of
jurisprudence; and these rights include, as a minimum, a right
to examine witnesses against him, to offer testimony, and to be
represented by counsel.
[13, 14] Except for a narrowly limited category of
contempts, due process of law as explained in the Cooke case
requires that one charged with contempt of court be advised of
the charges against him, have a reasonable opportunity to meet
them by way of defense or explanation, have the right to be
represented by counsel, and have a chance to testify and call
other witnesses in his behalf, either by way of defense or
explanation.
[16] It is "the law of the land" that no man's life,
liberty or property be forfeited as a punishment until there has
been a charge fairly made and fairly tried in a public tribunal.
See Chambers vs Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 236, 237, 60 S.Ct. 472,
477, 84 L.Ed. 716. The petitioner was convicted without that
kind of trial.
Michigan's one-man grand jury, as exemplified by this
record, combines in a single official the historically separate
powers of grand jury, committing magistrate, prosecutor, trial
judge and petit jury. This aggregated authority denies to the
accused not only the right to a public trial, but also those
other basic protections secured by the Sixth Amendment, namely,
the rights "to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation;1 to be confronted with the witnesses against him;
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."
____________________
1. The requirement, of course, contemplates that the accused be
so informed sufficiently in advance of trial or sentence to
enable him to determine the nature of the plea to be entered
and to prepare his defense if one is to be made.
Page Z - 7 of 14
The Federal Zone:
[Comment: Since the indictment contained a conclusion of law
that DEFENDANT was a "person required," he was therefore not
informed sufficiently in advance of trial to determine the nature
of his plea and to prepare his defense.]
I do not conceive that the Bill of Rights, apart from the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, incorporates all such
ideas. But as far as its provisions go, I know of no better
substitutes. A few may be inconvenient. But restrictions upon
authority for securing personal liberty, as well as fairness in
trial to deprive one of it, are always inconvenient -- to the
authority so restricted. And in times like these I do not think
substitutions imported from other systems, including continental
ones, offer promise on the whole of more improvement than harm,
either for the cause of perfecting the administration of justice
or for that of securing and perpetuating individual freedom,
which is the main end of our society as it is of our
Constitution. ... [I]t is both wiser and safer to put up with
whatever inconveniences that charter creates than to run the risk
of losing its hard-won guaranties by dubious, if also more
convenient substitutions imported from alien traditions.9
____________________
9. ... Whatever inconveniences these or any of them may be
thought to involve are far outweighed by the aggregate of
security to the individual afforded by the Bill of Rights.
That aggregate cannot be secured, indeed it may be largely
defeated, so long as the states are left free to make
broadly selective application of its protections.
[In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257]
[emphasis added]
[following quotes from United States vs Cruikshank]:
In criminal cases, prosecuted under the laws of the United
States, the accused has the constitutional right "to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation." Amend. VI. In U.S.
v. Mills, 7 Pet., 142, this was construed to mean that the
indictment must set forth the offense "with clearness and all
necessary certainty, to apprise the accused of the crime with
which he stands charged;" and in U.S. v. Cook, 17 Wall., 174 [84
U.S., XXI., 539], that "Every ingredient of which the offense is
composed must be accurately and clearly alleged." It is an
elementary principle of criminal pleading, that where the
definition of an offense, whether it be at common law or by
statute, "includes generic terms, it is not sufficient that the
indictment shall charge the offense in the same generic terms as
in the definition; but it must state the species; it must
descend to particulars." 1 Arch. Cr. Pr. and Pl., 291. The
object of the indictment is, first, to furnish the accused with
Page Z - 8 of 14
Appendix Z
such a description of the charge against him as will enable him
to make his defense, and avail himself of his conviction or
acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the
same cause; and, second, to inform the court of the facts
alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law
to support a conviction, if one should be had. For this, facts
are to be stated, not conclusions of law alone. A crime is made
up of acts and intent; and these must be set forth in the
indictment, with reasonable particularity of time, place and
circumstances.
[Comment: The indictment contained a conclusion of law that
DEFENDANT was a "person required"; it did not establish that he
was a "person required" as a matter of fact. The indictment also
failed to specify every ingredient of the offense, because it
failed to specify which IRC section made DEFENDANT a "person
required."]
The accused has, therefore, the right to have a
specification of the charge against him in this respect, in order
that he may decide whether he should present his defense by
motion to quash, demurrer or plea; and the court, that it may
determine whether the facts will sustain the indictment. ...
Therefore, the indictment should state the particulars, to inform
the court as well as the accused. It must be made to appear --
that is to say, appear from the indictment, without going further
-- that the acts charged will, if proved, support a conviction
for the offense alleged.
[Comment: If the indictment did not cite the statute which made
DEFENDANT a "person required," then the act charged, i.e. failing
to file, did not support a conviction for the alleged offense,
even if DEFENDANT admitted, under oath, that he did not file.]
Vague and indefinite allegations of the kind are not
sufficient to inform the accused in a criminal prosecution of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, within the
meaning of the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution.
Judge Story says the indictment must charge the time and
place and nature and circumstances of the offense with clearness
and certainty, so that the party may have full notice of the
charge, and be able to make his defense with all reasonable
knowledge and ability. 2 Story, Const., sec. 1785.
[Comment: An indictment with conclusions of law is necessarily
vague, indefinite, and insufficient to inform the accused of the
nature and cause of the accusation. An indictment with
conclusions of law does not exhibit clearness and certainty, so
that DEFENDANT did not have full notice of the charge, nor was he
able to make his defense with all reasonable knowledge and
ability.]
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The Federal Zone:
Reasonable certainty, all will agree, is required in
criminal pleading .... Accused persons, as matter of common
justice, ought to have the charge against them set forth in such
terms that they may readily understand the nature and character
of the accusation, in order that they, when arraigned, may know
what answer to make to it, and that they may not be embarrassed
in conducting their defense; and the charge ought also to be
laid in such terms that, if the party accused is put to trial,
the verdict and judgment may be pleaded in bar of a second
accusation for the same offense.
[Comment: If the indictment did not state the statute which made
DEFENDANT a "person required," then it failed to provide
DEFENDANT with reasonable certainty that he was in the class of
persons who were required to file in the years in question. He
did not know what answer to make to the indictment and, in fact,
refused to enter a plea. The mention of 6012 by an IRS witness
embarrassed DEFENDANT.]
Descriptive allegations in criminal pleading are required to
be reasonably definite and certain, as a necessary safeguard to
the accused against surprise, misconception and error in
conducting his defense, and in order that the judgment in the
case may be a bar to a second accusation for the same charge.
Considerations of the kind are entitled to respect; but it is
obvious, that, if such a description of the ingredient of an
offense created and defined by an Act of Congress is held to be
sufficient, the indictment must become a snare to the accused;
as it is scarcely possible that an allegation can be framed which
would be less certain, or more at variance with the universal
rule that every ingredient of the offense must be clearly and
accurately described so as to bring the defendant within the true
intent and meaning of the provision defining the offense. Such a
vague and indefinite description of a material ingredient of the
defense [sic] is not a compliance with the rules of pleading in
framing an indictment. On the contrary, such an indictment is
insufficient, and must be held bad on demurrer or in arrest of
judgment.
[United States vs Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 557]
[Comment: Similarly, the mention of 6012 by an IRS witness came
as a surprise to DEFENDANT (and to a gallery witness also, who
almost jumped out of his seat when the IRS witness first
mentioned it). The Court itself never mentioned 6012, nor did
the Court read this IRC section into the record. The indictment
must state every ingredient or element of the offense charged.
The first element of "failing to file" is that the defendant was
a "person required." But, required by what? The indictment
failed to state which IRC section established the filing
requirement.]
Page Z - 10 of 14
Appendix Z
[Notes from Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, West Publishing
Company, St. Paul, Minnesota, Volume 28]:
Under Const. art. 1, section 13, entitling defendant to
demand "nature and cause of accusation" against him and to have
copy thereof, defendant is entitled to have gist of offense
charged in direct and unmistakable terms. Large v. State, 164
N.E. 263, 264, 200 Ind. 430.
The words "nature and cause of the accusation" in Const.
Bill of Rights, art. 1, section 13, providing that an accused
shall have the right to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, mean that the gist of an offense shall be
charged in direct and unmistakable terms. Hinshaw v. State, 122
N.E. 418, 420, 188 Ind. 147.
[Comment: The terms of a penalty statute are indirect and
mistakable terms. They are indirect because they necessarily
involve another statute which specifies "persons required." They
are mistakable because it is quite possible for grand juries to
make mistakes in their conclusions of law. If the statute is
vague, then it is probable that grand juries will make mistakes.]
A constitutional requirement that a person accused of crime
shall enjoy the right to be "informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation" against him means, by a long line of precedents,
resting on principle, that in a prosecution for the commission of
a statutory offense the words of the statute, or others of fully
equivalent import, should be employed. State v. Judge of
Criminal Dist. Ct. for Parish of Orleans, 21 So. 690, 691, 49
La.Ann. 231.
[Comment: The words of the statute which made DEFENDANT a
"person required" were not expressed either by the indictment,
nor by the Court when challenged to express them.]
Constitutional provision requiring indictment to inform
accused of "nature and cause of accusation" means that indictment
to be valid must at least fully and plainly identify the offense,
so that defendant may defend properly and later plead a
conviction or acquittal in bar of a subsequent charge for the
same offense, and so that court may pronounce sentence on
conviction according to the right of the case. Const. art. 1,
section 10, State v. Domanski, R.I., 190 A. 854, 857.
[Comment: Indictment did not fully identify the offense.
DEFENDANT could not defend properly. DEFENDANT was unable to
enter a plea; the presiding judge entered it for him and later
instructed the jury that the DEFENDANT had entered a plea of "not
guilty."]
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The Federal Zone:
[following quotations from Large vs State]:
1. Indictment and Information: 71 -- Defendant is entitled to
have offense charged in direct and unmistakable terms; "nature
and cause of accusation" (Const. art. 1, section 13).
Under Const. art. 1, section 13, entitling defendant to
demand "nature and cause of accusation," against him and to have
copy thereof, defendant is entitled to have gist of offense
charged in direct and unmistakable terms.
It is the constitutional right of the defendant to demand
the nature and cause of the accusation against him and to have a
copy thereof. Article 1, section 13, Constitution of Indiana,
McLaughlin v. State, 45 Ind. 388.
[1] In Hinshaw v. State, 188 Ind. 147, 122 N.E. 418, it is
said the words "nature and cause of the accusation" have a well-
defined meaning and had such a meaning at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution. That meaning is that the gist of
an offense shall be charged in direct and mistakable terms. In
passing upon the same provision of the Federal Constitution in
United States v. Cruikshank (1875) 92 U.S. 542, 557 (23 L.Ed.
588), the court said: "In criminal cases, prosecuted under the
laws of the United States, the accused has the constitutional
right 'to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.'
Amend. VI. In United States v. Mills, 7 Pet. 142 [8 L.Ed. 636],
this was construed to mean that the indictment must set forth the
offense 'with clearness and all necessary certainty, to apprise
the accused of the crime with which he stands charged.' And in
United States v. Cook, 17 Wall 174 [21 L.Ed. 538], that 'every
ingredient of which the offense is composed must be accurately
and clearly alleged.' It is an elementary principle of criminal
pleading, that where the definition of an offense, whether it be
at common law or by Statute, 'includes generic terms, it is not
sufficient that the indictment shall charge the offense in the
same generic terms as in the definition; but it must state the
species; it must descend to the particulars.'"
In Mayhew v. State, 189 Ind. 545, 128 N.E. 599, it is said:
"The particular crime with which the accused is charged must be
preferred [sic] with such reasonable certainty by the essential
averments in the pleading as will enable the court and jury to
distinctly understand what is to be tried and determined, and
fully inform the defendant of the particular charge he is to
meet. The averments must be so clear and distinct that there may
be no difficulty in determining what evidence is admissible
thereunder." [numerous citations follow]
Section 2225, Burns' 1926 (section 2063, Burns' 1914) clause
10, provides that no indictment or affidavit shall be deemed
invalid, nor shall the same be set aside or quashed, nor shall
the crime charged or other proceedings be stayed or arrested or
in any manner affected for any of the following: "* * * For
Page Z - 12 of 14
Appendix Z
any * * * defect or imperfection which does not tend to the
prejudice of the substantial rights of the defendant upon the
merits."
[Large vs State, 164 N.E. 263, 264]
[Comment: DEFENDANT's indictment tended to prejudice his
substantial 6th Amendment right to know the "nature and cause of
the accusation." It did not descend to the particulars; the
presiding judge denied his motion for a Bill of Particulars.]
[following quotations from Hinshaw vs State]:
7. Indictment and Information: 56 -- Constitutional Law --
Pleading
Acts 1915, c. 62, relating to the sufficiency of criminal or
civil pleading, is void so far as it applies to indictments,
because Const. Bill of Rights, art. 1, section 13, provides that
an accused shall have the right to demand the nature and cause of
the accusation against him.
8. Indictment and Information: 70 -- "Nature and Cause of
Accusation."
The words "nature and cause of the accusation" in Const.
Bill of Rights, art. 1, section 13, providing that an accused
shall have the right to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, mean that the gist of an offense shall be
charged in direct and unmistakable terms.
This act (chapter 62 of the Acts of 1915, p. 123) is void,
so far as it applies to indictments, because section 13 of
article 1 of the Bill of Rights of the state Constitution
provides that "the accused shall have the right to demand the
nature and cause of the accusation against him and to have a copy
thereof." The words "nature and cause of the accusation" have a
well-defined meaning, and had such meaning at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution. That meaning is, that the gist of
an offense shall be charged in direct and unmistakable terms. In
passing upon the same provision of the federal Constitution in
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 557 (23 L.Ed. 588), the
court says: "In criminal cases, prosecuted under the laws of the
United States, the accused has the constitutional right 'to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.' Amend. VI.
In United States v. Mills, 7 Pet. 142 [8 L.Ed. 636], this was
construed to mean that the indictment must set forth the offense
'with clearness and all necessary certainty, to apprise the
accused of the crime with which he stands charged'; and in
United States v. Cook, 17 Wall. 174 [21 L.Ed. 538], that 'every
ingredient of which the offense is composed must be accurately
and clearly alleged.' It is an elementary principle of criminal
pleading, that where the definition of an offense, whether it be
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The Federal Zone:
at common law or by statute, 'includes generic terms, it is not
sufficient that the indictment shall charge the offense in the
same generic terms as in the definition; but it must state the
species -- it must descend to the particulars.'"
[Hinshaw vs State, 122 N.E. 418, 420, emphasis added]
[following quotations from State vs Judge of Criminal Dist. Ct.
for Parish of Orleans]:
1. Every party charged with crime has the constitutional
right to have subjected to judicial investigation and testing the
fact whether or not any particular charge made against him has
come up to the standard of legal requirement or not ....
That to the best of his knowledge and belief the criminal
district court is absolutely without jurisdiction to try said
cause by reason of there being no legal information pending
against him in said court. That he verily believes (1) that, if
the judge of said court be not prohibited from proceeding further
in this cause, he will force relator to trial, and impose a
sentence upon him (if convicted) in a case wherein there is no
appeal, and will forever deprive relator of his constitutional
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him before trial, and will thereby cause relator
irreparable injury. ...
[Comment: Going to jail when you're innocent, as proven by a
conviction that is overturned for violating the 6th Amendment, is
an irreparable injury.]
We should have to be convinced that the objections to the
information were such as in point of fact would leave an accused
in ignorance of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him. The objections should not be such as the party making them
could only hope to succeed upon by the application of the most
stringent technical rules as to form and as to pleading -- such
defects as, in our opinion, would really work no injury.
[State vs Judge of Criminal Dist. Ct. for Parish of Orleans]
[21 So. 690, 691, 49 La.Ann. 231]
[Comment: The IRC section which made DEFENDANT a "person
required" is not a stringent technical rule as to form and as to
pleading. DEFENDANT remained in ignorance of this IRC section
throughout the trial and throughout all pre-trial hearings.]
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